

The Essences of the Present Gulf Crisis: Learning from the Past to Construct for the Future

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Abstract: *The primary motive for this research is the increasing debates and discussions around the GCC crisis that has become the utmost political item for daily news, not only in the Middle East but even in the internal politics of super powers in the world. The main cause of the crisis revolves around alleged accusations of terrorist supporting activities and extremism affiliations of Qatar's authority with specific groups and entities in Qatar and in the region, yet other causes have been replenished to the crisis as it seems to be a confrontation for seizing supremacy and command in the region and settling the Palestinian issue in a proposed American-Israeli political fashion. Nevertheless, to address the issue, a study as well as analysis of the previous timelines of policies, politics, and affairs in the region that took place between Qatar and its neighbours on one side, and with other influencing issues and countries on the other side would eventually lead to a comprehensive answer to the essence of the current crisis. The results show that the crisis is rooted to the time when the previous Emir of Qatar resumed authority over his father (The Founder) the pro-Saudi. So when his ambition of placing Qatar on the World map of politics as an effective and a leading figure in the political arena of the GCC and the region, adding to that Qatar's mysterious relations with Iran, and its varied sided positions in the Arab Spring all contributed to make a crisis become a conflict. The implication of this result may provide an immediate indication whether this conflict will be solved peacefully or further drag the region into a dangerous whirlpool of divided interests. It is important though to indicate that this research will not engage in discovering what might occur as a consequence of this crisis since the on-going problem has little literature that could be utilized for establishing a framework for discussing possible culminations of the crisis.*

1. INTRODUCTION

“The leaders of the six Gulf States reached a cooperative framework to effect coordination, integration and inter-connection among the Member States in all fields in order to achieve unity, according to article 4 of the GCC Charter. Article 4 also emphasized the deepening and strengthening of relations, links and areas of cooperation among their citizens. The underpinnings which are clearly provided for in the preamble of the GCC Charter, confirm “the [unique] relations, common qualities and similar systems founded on the creed of Islam, faith in a common destiny and sharing one goal, and that the cooperation among these states would serve the sublime objectives of the Arab nation”. (GCC, 2017) This is how the unified charter of GCC operation indicates for the nature of relations between the six Gulf States.

The charter also included “The decision was not a product of the moment but an institutional embodiment of a historical, social and cultural reality. Deep religious and cultural ties link the six states, and strong kin relations prevail among their citizens. All these factors, enhanced by one geographical entity extending from sea to desert, have facilitated contacts and interaction among them, and created homogeneous values and characteristics” (GCC, 2017) These are unquestionably very stunning and astonishing statements that point to a single fact that this Council is unique in its elements of foundation, which categorically strikes the pursuer of the current crisis, how it could happen in an organized, unified and loyal Council.

Nevertheless, The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is fronting its notable existential crisis since its foundation in 1981. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and The Kingdom of Bahrain joined forces on June 5, 2017, to disunite diplomatic stalemates and execute an embargo on Qatar (Berridge, 2005, p. 77), while The State of Kuwait and Sultanate Oman remained disinterested. It is factual, however, that the crisis has been long in the production, conversely, key

factors allowed it to intensely evolve in recent years (ACWD, 2017). The general notion indicates that the approaching weeks and months may resolve whether this rift will be further internationalized or rather contained within the GCC taking into account the GCC Charter statement of unity and unique relations between these rival states and kingdoms.

The current and starting actions on the crisis has seen Kuwait leading the mediation efforts, the Emir of Kuwait is becoming a negotiator in this smouldering row. On the other hand, Turkey has announced its intent to deploy troops in Qatar and completed several deployments since the commencement of the crisis thus making an intervention in the supposed unified council. The government of Israel countersigned the three GCC countries view, while Iran remained vigilant, and US policy has been indecisive to say the least. A lot is at stake for US national security policy, including the scenario of living with a divided GCC, the likely enlargement of Iranian influence, and questions regarding the future of Al-Udeid Air Base and last but not least the Palestinian issue, which may emerge as a key element in the sudden break out of the crisis (ACWD, 2017).

This research will explore the above crisis in a detailed but precise content to reach a conclusion as well as a comprehension of the roots as well as the causes of this crisis. Thus, the author will begin by, first, exploring the historical relations among the GCC and previous crisis that particularly took place between Qatar and other states in the council and its positions from the Arab Spring. This, exploring, may assist in building up a framework of analysis to retort the research question of what may have been additional from past relations that could have formed and constructed the basis of today's crisis alongside what is revolving in the minds of the American administration for the region and the Palestinian issue. The research will also look at the visit of the US president to the GCC in 2017 and his historical meeting with most Arab leaders including Qatar soon after the crisis broke out. The above discussion in the research would form the body of the research that would lead to the most significant aspect of this research that is connecting all literature together to generate an understanding of why the U.S ignited the spark of this crisis to assist Saudi Arabia and its allies in pressuring Qatar to accept certain conditions; in addition to the origins of this crisis, which would finally allow the reader to look into future scenarios of the crisis and what might occur in the near future, in addition to providing potential research studies on the issue for further analysis, taking into account the shortage of literature on the topic.

2. RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The small but rich Gulf State of Qatar is determined to embrace a leading role in the Arab world, and has readjusted its external policy in the rouse of the Arab Spring. In doing so, Qatar has tried to stick to its previous strategy of maintaining decent relations with all countries that could be vital to Qatar's survival - primarily the US and Iran. At the same time Doha (which until 2011 had mostly counted on the totalitarian status quo in the region) hopes to benefit from the fresh turmoil in the Arab world by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist opposition assemblies. In regard to Syria, this policy is threatening to bring Qatar into conflict with its powerful neighbour Iran. While Qatar publicly declared its backing for the resistance early in the summer of 2011, Iran hungers to save Bashar al-Assad's regime and by this means ensure the survival of its main ally in the Middle East. The Syrian crisis could risk destabilising Qatar's old-fashioned balancing act between the US and its allies on the one hand and Iran and its allies on the other hand (GIISF, 2012).

Since the start of the Arab Spring, Qatar has been one of the leading supporters of the protests movements in North Africa and Middle East. It has played a key role in virtually all the conflicts in the Arab World. Qatar's tactic first became apparent in March, 2011, when Doha urged Arab League to support a NATO involvement in Libya. With regard to Syria, Doha hesitated at first but then, in early summer of the same year, stimulated the protest movement and took the lead among the Arab League states that were imposing sanctions against Bashar Al-Assad regime. Qatar's clear position on Libya and Syria signalled at least an incomplete move away from its previous policy, which had focused chiefly on mediating between conflicting parties and uphold decent relations with all powers in the region including today's rivals in the GCC (GIISF, 2012).

The above movement in Qatar's policy derived from mid 1990s since Qatar has been trying to increase its transnational profile and raise interest among as many powerful countries as probable in Qatar and in the solidity of the regime of the ruling Al-Thani Family. This policy is fundamentally defined by Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, who has been emir of Qatar since 1995, and his prime

minister and foreign minister Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani. Up until the 1990s, Qatar was considered to be under the benefaction of its powerful neighbour, Saudi Arabia since Emir Hamad came to authority, however, he has steadily emphasised his country's independence. This approach is reflected; for instance, in the establishment of the satellite channel Al Jazeera. Generally, Qatar wanted to sustain virtuous ties to the US, Iran and its regional allies. It hoped that by mediating in conflicts in Sudan, Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine, it would be seen as a major player in the region (GIISF, 2012).

In assessment of its own military weakness, Qatar primarily attempted to develop closer ties to the US in terms of security policy. In 1995, Qatar signed a defence agreement with the Clinton administration and spent the consequent years fostering its military ties to Washington. In 2003, the US military began operating the Al Udiyd Air Base in Qatar, its most important air base in the Middle East. Doha believes that the US existence is a vital in protecting it from its neighbours. (GIISF, 2012). At the same time, Qatar's leaders are caught in a predicament. On the one hand, they fear that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and plans to embrace a more hostile hegemonic policy within the Gulf region. On the other hand, they care that the US or Israel might attack Iran's nuclear plants. Iran has beforehand overtly threatened Qatar with indeterminate revenge if either of those countries does target its atomic facilities. Qatar is predominantly terrified that Iran could attack its gas infrastructure (GIISF, 2012).

It is important to mention that Iran and Qatar share the world's biggest gas field, which the Qataris call North Field and the Iranians call South Pars. Both countries must therefore collaborate over the long term if they are to get the maximum benefit from the gas reserves; thus no one should question the continuous relation between Qatar and Iran since it is a must for exploitation of gas by Qatar. Continuing exploitation of the field will bring the gas wells closer and closer together, making border disputes more likely. The Iranian government is already concerned about Qatar's energy policy. Thanks to its superior technology, Qatar extracts far more gas from the shared field. While Iran's chronic financial despairs mean it cannot find the money to handle the high initial investment costs of gas production, Qatar has become the world's biggest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG). (GIISF, 2012). While working with the US to increase protection of its energy infrastructure at the same time, it was careful to avoid unreasonably provoking Tehran and to maintain active discourse with its neighbour; indeed, Qatar is in a very problematical situation.

Nevertheless, the time line events between Qatar and its fellow states in the Gulf Council does not articulate to a smooth and outgoing relation in a unified union as the charter of the GCC accord indicates. Hostile events, diplomatic problems, and constant disagreements over regional and international issues are the norm for this Council (ACWD, 2017). The viewer of the timeline events between Qatar and GCC, particularly of the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would predicate to a crisis as today's one. These disputed are ranging from disputes over borders as with Saudi Arabia over Khafus¹ area alongside disputes with Bahrain over islands of Hawar², which later was sent to the International Court of Justice something appeared as an appealing to happen in a unified council (BBC, 1998).

This had also evolved when Al Jazeera Broadcast has opened in 1996 and for its earlier programmes it attacked the Saudi ruling family that resulted in cutting of diplomatic relations. However, the follower of this changing time line of events would rather think of a more serious issue that led to the current crisis and began long before 2017.

All started when Qatar desired possessing a larger political stance internationally over GCC customary led by Saudi Arabia. The above accumulated events were further evolved the causes of the current crisis essence to revolve around Qatar's mysterious relations with Iran which was explained above as a must if Qatar to benefit from the shared Gas with Iran yet the rival states do not recognize this as a legitimate excuse for cooperation (Berridge, 2005: 93-97).

¹ A boarder area between Qatar and Saudi Arabia where a dispute over the legitimacy of ruling it took place in 1982 (BBC, 1998).

² 'The Hawar islands are located off the west coast of Qatar, but are controlled by Bahrain, which now plans to develop them for tourism and investment. Qatar says this is a breach of the 1987 bilateral agreement which forbids any change in the islands' status' (BBC, 1998).

Moving on to the start of the Arab Spring when Qatar's backing for resistance movements was narrow to perspective that pretended no physical or socio-political risk to internal stability of the country and even for the GCC collectively. Nonetheless, even this narrow support was adequate to produce substantial friction with Qatar's GCC neighbours, who regarded the explaining unrest with greater eagerness and fear. Thus, just as Qatar intensified its wide-ranging regional reaction to the Arab spring, it opened up a widening breach with neighbouring states (Ulrichsen, KC, 2014, p: 118). However, in the abrupt aftermath of the Arab spring disturbances in 2011, Saudi Arabia and UAE emerged as architects of policies that targeted to diminish the upshot from regional unpredictability, withdrawing provision from careworn leaders in Libya, Yemen, and Syria where essential, but remaining penetratingly sceptical of protests closer to the region, which they blamed on suspected interfering by Iran and later by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ulrichsen, KC, 2014, p: 118).

On condition that, Iran was the exterior adversary that allowed regimes to express the origins of political demonstration by attributing them to foreign interfering in place of replicating internal criticisms, Qatar was generally on harmless ground vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. The history of closer relations between Qatar and Iran apart, sectarian tensions mounted through the Gulf during 2011 (Ulrichsen, KC, 2014, p: 119). Official voices in Riyadh, Manama and Abu Dhabi recognized the insistent and fatal political protests in Bahrain and Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia to Iranian intrusion in Arab Gulf Businesses. Consequently, Bahrain's foreign minister, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, expressed in April 2011 that "we have never seen such a sustained campaign from Iran on Bahrain and the Gulf as we have seen in the past two months" (Ulrichsen, KC, 2014, p: 119) while the UAE foreign minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, frankly cautioned Iran to respect the harmony and autonomy of GCC (Ulrichsen, KC, 2014, p: 119). Undeniably, Qatari initiatives, such as the emir's 2012 official visit to Gaza Strip and escalating support from the Gulf States for anti-Assad rebellious in Syria, fell into a far-reaching outline of GCC states' efforts to separate Iran's regional proxies from Tehran's embrace.

However, part of the timeline events, Iran's intervention with Qatar, and the Arab Spring; it is imperative at stage of the research to focus on the transparent causes that were uttered by the embargo countries as of the frank support of Qatar to Islamists groups, Hamas in particular.

When Palestinian revolutionary group Hamas proclaimed its fresh policy document to the world, it wasn't from Ramallah or Gaza City, but from the Sheraton hotel's gilded Salwa Ballroom in Doha. Indeed, it was no wonder that Hamas chose Qatar since it is the home of leaving Hamas leader, Khaled Meshaal, and some of his high-ranking headship.

"Qatar is quite important for Hamas," said H.A. Hellyer, a senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council. "Qatar provides strong financial aid to the occupied Palestinian territories and is a safe haven for a number of Hamas leaders." (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

The current crisis in the Persian Gulf area is putting that relationship in threat and it may seem very much as the one of core issues of the outbreak of the crisis although Qatar's relationship with Hamas had not been among the biggest issues dividing the region.

Dissimilar from the US, Britain, and Europe, all of which label Hamas as a terrorist organization, some Arab states - including Qatar - do not consider this. This was something Qatar's Foreign Minister sought to remind people in an interview with Russia's RT, in response to a call from his Saudi counterpart that Qatar stop supporting Hamas; Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said:

"The US views Hamas as a terror organization. But to the rest of the Arab nations, it is a legitimate resistance movement. We do not support Hamas, we support the Palestinian people," he added that "Hamas' presence [in Doha] is coordinated with the US and the countries in the region, and it is part of our effort to mediate between the Palestinian factions to reach reconciliation." (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

It is clear thus, that US and its allied have changed courses suddenly; at some stage they ask Qatar to host Hamas and later, for some unknown reasons, they change course. Qatar does not want to play a double standard with the Palestinian people; it has the right to support the resistance movement that has been long supported by the majority of the Palestinians in and outside west bank and Gaza Strip.

For this part, Hamas indicates it is being squeezed irrationally. What is in the mind of the Americans and Zionists at this particular moment in time that they want to squeeze both Hamas and Qatar unless

a settlement in the American – Zionist fashion is about to take place, and thus, pressure must be placed on Qatar and Hamas.

"The Gulf Countries are pressuring Qatar to cut relations with resistance organizations. This is unacceptable and we refuse this pressure," Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoom said in a statement to CNN. "We are a resistance movement and the whole world is a witness to this." (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

The tracker of Hamas activities in the last few years would notice a series of a continues pressures being placed on the movement to recognize the Zionist state and be part of any settlement proposed by the pro-Americans Arabs and European countries involved in the alleged peace process. And this is why Qatar has also been put in the pressure process; Hamas must be sieged to recognize the Zionist state and adhere to all conditions for any peace agreement.

This pressure has witnessed some changes on Hamas policies last month; a new leader was declared Ismail Haniya who is succession from long-time leader Khald Meshaal; at the same time as the militant group issued its new policy document.

In the internal Zionist view, the fact the new document continued to adopt violent resistance, and a vow to the elimination of the Zionist entity, other viewers said the document's explanation of a Palestinian state with the borders remaining on the eve of the Six Day War in 1967 provided indication of a new self-control by Hamas, which means the pressure placed is making its effect, and perhaps Hamas need more of it if to comply well with any future requirements for peace.

As Hamas were absorbing those changes, so the leadership was unexpectedly compulsory to pay cautious attention to diplomatic developments. Hellyer perceives two main reasons the nine regional allies are rotating their attention to Hamas. (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

"First, Hamas has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood organization, which puts it in the firing line of Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia," Hellyer says. "But I think this has more to do with western [addressees]. The Saudi leaders took benefit of Trump's acknowledgement of them as an influential performer in the region and that might have refreshed them." Indeed, in his recent visit to Saudi Arabia Trump met with most of Arab and Muslim leaders and Saudi Arabia was the host of this meeting, a recognition signal from trump that Saudi Arabia is the leading figure for this region and not anyone else. Trump also took advantage of this meeting to spark the trigger of this crisis that led later to the current fragmentation among GCC. (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

Al Jazeera Broadcast Television, based in Qatar, has been a prickle in the side of regional absolute rulers for years. Qatar's regional inspiration also comes from provision for Islamists, whether it is the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas at one end of the scale, or Al Qaeda at the other. Nevertheless, Doha has used this power to discuss with various groups including the Taliban, as well as to aid convert ceasefires between Israel and Hamas. (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

Al Jazeera grew surplus basis in Egypt after the revolution and election of Mohamed Morsy who hailed from the Muslim Brotherhood. The international public praised the new Egyptian president for fetching an immediate termination to a war between Gaza militants and Israel that same year.

In the long run, though, as it ragged across the region, the Arab Spring showed to be catastrophic for Hamas, which saw the number of countries it could call a friend shaped away.

"Hamas had very strong relations with Syria, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and Iran," says Mustafa Barghouti, an independent Palestinian politician. "Things have changed over time so they had to diversify relations." (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

Before 2012, the Hamas leadership was based out of Damascus. Tensions grew between the militants and the administration of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad as upheaval riveted the country. Ultimately, Hamas sided with the rebels and censored connections to some magnitude with Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran.

"Hamas lost a lot in the uprisings," says Hellyer. "This is one of the reasons why Qatar stepped in." Indeed, when the upheaval in Syria resulted in relations cut with the regime, Iran, and Hezbollah, Hams were placed in a very difficult, there has to be a substitute to rely on. Qatar was the one Hamas was looking for; through financial aid, hosting Hamas leaders in Doha, and political international support Qatar relieved Hamas. (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

In the fall of 2012, the head of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, visited Gaza Strip he became the first world leader to act so under Hamas control. The emir initiated projects value hundreds of millions of dollars. In the emptiness left by other countries, Qatar saw its effect over the Strip increasing rapidly. (CNN, By Lan, 2017). However, this status did not last long; Doha's motivations smash a barricade on July 3, 2013 when Mohamed Morsy was overthrown by Egypt's military in a coup. The Muslim Brotherhood was bared of their authority and their influence. The new ruler General Abdel Fatah El Sisi was antagonistic toward Qatar and Hamas. He even blamed Hamas of supporting the Brotherhood in the post-coup fierceness (CNN, By Lan, 2017). Hundreds of smuggling tunnels, along the border with Gaza, were taken out of action, thus dissolving a vivacious lifeline to the shoreline strip. Indeed, relations between Hamas and Cairo grew consequently unscrupulous that Egyptian specialists cheered Israel and praised Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during the 2014 war between Gaza Militants and Israel (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

Less than three years later, and that Egyptian bitterness, shared by its Arab allies, exist at the present as a rule play targeted at bending Qatar to its willpower.

"It's difficult to imagine Qatar able to hold out against such a restrictive system around them. I expect quite a few people in Qatar are looking for a way to compromise," explains Hellyer. "The problem is, the temperature has risen so much so quickly that there are no face saving measures. If Doha concedes to the demands, it'll look quite bad for Doha internally." (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

However, if the talk revolves around cutting off relations with Hamas and sieging it after suspension of relations with all countries, having lost Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, a break with Qatar will not damage Hamas since the movement survived previously without foreign aid, but it would assuredly multifarious the calamitous circumstances in Gaza and this is the major concern.

According to the United Nations, the unemployment rate in the strip is more than 40% and 1 million people rely on food hand-outs from the UN's Palestinian refugee agency (UNRWA, 2016).

"It's a very serious, dangerous and explosive situation," says Barghouti. "Qatar has been helping the Gazans by supplying them with electricity and fuel. Breaking ties would drastically affect the civilians. My worry is squeezing Hamas too much could lead to certain splits and allow certain radicalization." (CNN, By Lan, 2017).

Thus, it would appear that cutting the relations with Hamas after the late disunited with Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah is one of the main causes that led to this crisis in the GCC. America and the Zionist state would not release this golden opportunity of the weakness and loneliness of Hamas and thus it tries to complete this by disuniting Hamas with Qatar its last supporter ever. By doing so, the part of the mysterious plan to settle the Palestinian issue will be achieved and it will ease out the path for the Americans and the Zionist state to concentrate on more important issues in the region.

Moving to another significant essence in this crisis that is the visit of Donald Trump to the Middle East, which soon after the crisis has broken out. The gathering that was attended by most Arab and Muslim leaders in Saudi Arabia revealed the objective of the visit Donald Trump has accused Qatar of subsidising as well as supporting terrorism at the premier levels, in an unexpected intensification of the diplomatic row with one of America's most vital military partners in the Middle East. This, however, is not a product of a sudden interest of the U.S. but it is rather how America treats and deals with the leaders in this region. The U.S. perceives leaders in this region as operatives for the U.S. and thus they must adhere to whatever directives are being thrown at them; something Qatar may refuse to do at the beginning, which led the U.S. to activate the three years old dispute between Saudi Arabia and UAW with Qatar.

Astonishingly, speaking in the White House rose garden on Friday July the 9th, Trump said he had decided "the time had come to call on Qatar to end its funding ... and its extremist ideology." (The Guardian, 2017).

His statements marked his most candid intrusion in a crisis triggered on Monday the 5th of July when Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies launched a co-ordinated diplomatic and economic campaign to siege Qatar. Trump said that Arab leaders he met in Saudi Arabia had admonished him to contest Qatar, which they reproach of patronage extremist groups.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia has been long waiting for this moment to squeeze Qatar and bring it to its wants, as it could not do in 2014 when a minor diplomatic dispute took place between them.

Trump's words are really astonishing that no one could imagine that the U.S. strongest allies in the region may encounter such criticism as well as accusation openly.

“So we had a decision to make: do we take the easy road, or do we finally take a hard but necessary action? We have to stop the funding of terrorism,” he said. “The nation of Qatar, unfortunately, has historically been a funder of terrorism at a very high level.” Trump said. (The Guardian, 2017).

Trump's interference came after Saudi Arabia and its allies sanctioned a dozen organisations and 59 people it accused of associations to Islamist belligerency – a number of them Qataris or have connection with Qatar.

Minister of Defence of the states said, “The emir of Qatar has made progress in halting financial support and expelling terrorists from his country, but he must do more and he must do it more quickly.” (The Guardian, 2017). Some political thinkers would related this statement to the UAE's ambassador to Washington who has appeared since the breakout of the crisis as a strange figure throwing comments and leaking information about various topics in the region. There is a defiantly link between what the ambassador utters and what the U.S administration seeks in the crisis; as some believe the ambassador turns to be an unofficial spokesperson for the administration. In his recent talk the UAE's ambassador to Washington welcomed Trump's comments. “The UAE welcomes President Trump's leadership in challenging Qatar's troubling support for extremism. The next step is for Qatar to acknowledge these concerns and commit to re-examine its regional policies,” said Yousef Al Otaiba, according to Reuters. (The Guardian, 2017).

Overall, the essences of the crisis, thus, have taught some lessons from the past and it obviously constructed a framework of comprehension for the future of this crisis. Qatar's foreign minister labelled the blockade as a desecration of international law and said there was an endeavour to drum up international outlook against the Gulf emirate. “These procedures that were taken have clear violations of international law and international humanitarian law. They will not have a positive impact on the region but a negative one,” Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani told reporters on Friday 9th of July during a visit to Germany. (The Guardian, 2017).

Encompassed in the Saudi sanctions list, which was censured as “baseless and without foundation in fact” by Qatar – are the Qatari-funded Qatar Charity and Eid Charity, and several protuberant figures including businessmen, politicians, army and police officers and senior members of the ruling family, one a former interior minister. (The Guardian, 2017).

The list also includes the Muslim Brotherhood's spiritual leader, Youssef al-Qaradawi, who is based in Doha, and individuals in Libya as well as Shia groups in Bahrain seen by some Gulf Arab governments as allied to Iran.

The sanctions incline further constricts the screws on Qatar, home-based to a strategic US military base and the host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup; that many doubt it may take place on time.

It also strappingly advocates a flaring of the belligerent Saudi-led movement beyond Qatar itself – not least in contradiction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – where Youssef al-Qaradawi was exasperated and pass judgment to death in absentia following the 2013 military coup d'état of the elected president Mohamed Morsi, a Brotherhood affiliate.

Although Qatar has long lavished with associate or backing terror assemblages, western diplomats have indicted it of countenancing the subsidy of certain Sunni intemperate, such as al-Qaida branch in Syria. The same indictments have been leveled against personages in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Omar Saif Ghobas, the UAE's ambassador to Russia, said: “There is no trust, it has gone. So when the Qatari foreign minister says, ‘Listen, we need to engage in dialogue,’ we have done that for many years – that's just a statement for western consumption.” (The Guardian, 2017).

The crisis also has incited anxieties in Qatar, a foremost gas exporter as well as an international travel nucleus, whose flagship carrier Qatar Airways has been enforced to hover tortuous and affluent routes over Iran and Turkey after being blocked away in the Middle East.

Thus, it appears from the above discussions and analysis of sequence events and stages of the political episodes that took place since the start of the crisis that this is a deliberate act led by the U.S. administration for forcing Qatar to adhere to Saudi Arabia and its allies for their conditions. The

previous accumulated time events that took place between Qatar and its neighbours in the GCC also predicted this crisis as a larger magnitude than the one in 2014. The accusations that are been thrown at Qatar are too serious and risky enough to compromise the international stance against Qatar and the form of future diplomatic relations with it; this may also lead to further requirements by Western countries particularly for the terrorism related accusations.

3. CONCLUSION

In July the 5th, 2017, a crisis materialized between the state of Qatar, a member of the GCC, and Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kingdom of Bahrain in addition to other outside parties, mainly, The Arab Republic of Egypt.

The breakout of the current crisis in the GCC is in contradiction to the GCC Charter, which points towards the unity and solidity of relations among GCC members. It could have never been imagined and predicted that the GCC may end up in a crisis as of today's magnitude. On the other hand, predictions led followers of the GCC politics to predict such a situation long before this crisis; as many of GCC written agreements and cooperation policies were not fully implemented throughout the years since the establishment of the GCC.

The causes of this crisis have varied, but this research intended for the finding of some of the main roots of this crisis in an attempt to comprehend what led to this crisis in the GCC and not to discover a solution or what might occur at the end of it, as this is intended in a further research depending on the development and progress of events in the future.

Qatar's stance and clear directional take on the Arab Spring made it a striking enemy for many Arab leaders such as Libya, Syria, Egypt and some GCC opponents. The immediate reaction was Saudi Arabia seeing Qatar occupying a larger space than its political size. Saudi Arabia regards itself the leader of the GCC and even the Arab World; having a small country and a member of the same council of cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other allies meant that Qatar is encountering and contrasting them. Qatar supported the revolution in Egypt and it backed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt something very much annoyed Saudi Arabia and its allies in the GCC. This Qatari support threatened the supreme position Saudi Arabia is assuming in the region in addition to the internal politics of some GCC members.

This, however, was further evolved the rift between Qatar and Saudi Arabia by supporting Hamas soon after it was disunited with Syria, Hezbollah and Iran. This move even regarded by Saudi Arabia and other GCC members as a hostile step against them and thus it may further threaten their existing in the rouse of Arab Spring.

Alongside this, the timeline events that took place between Qatar and its rivals from GCC has even intensified the dispute as both sides returned previous events and started throwing accusations that led to today's crisis.

However, a major occurrence happened that changed the overall take with Qatar on the above issues, which is Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia and his pronouncement of Qatar support of terrorism. It was the green light Saudi Arabia and its affiliated GCC members were in anticipation of, Saudi Arabia sieged Qatar and on-going episodes of accusations' throwing kicked off and yet to finish. Qatar rejected all denunciations and is single-minded to follow steps to defend itself whether with the help of Iran or Turkey it will not surrender effortlessly.

Although the literature and previous engagements on this topic was minimal, this research may mark a starting point for further research to develop the subject or create a sophisticated hypothesis to analyse more discussions on the crisis; specifically if it is solved or not in near future.

I would finally suggest carrying out a further research into the current crisis of the GCC in order to find out what possible settlements or evolvments the crisis may proceed to, considering that the future research will be conducted in forms of interviews with high ranking officials within GCC alongside international state actors of the same calibre to seek unpretentious articulated statements from them.

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Citation: Ayman Tawalbeh. "The Essences of the Present Gulf Crisis: Learning from the Past to Construct for the Future" *International Journal of Political Science (IJPS)*, vol 5, no.2, 2019, pp. 11-19. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.20431/2454-9452.0502003>.

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