

Looking at Conflict Management in the Lenses of Power: A Review of IGAD Interventions in the Horn of Africa

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Abstract: *This paper has looked at how the concept of power has manipulated conflict management processes, by IGAD in the Horn of Africa. The horn of Africa has been known to be one of the most volatile and conflict torn regions in the world. The region has continued to be a venue for intrastate and interstate conflicts in the post colonial era. The role of regional organization in conflict management cannot be overstated. While IGAD has made significant achievements in pacifying the region, there are still more strides to be made, towards a peaceful region. This work has tried to see the works of IGAD, in peacemaking, in the lenses of power. The aspect of the distribution of power, among the IGAD member states, has advised the sub regional body whether or not to intervene in a conflict situation within the region; and to a larger extent, how to intercede. While drawing a theoretical review of the concept of power, this paper has tried to establish the rankings of states, in terms of power. Among the key findings, its noticeable that distribution of power among the IGAD member states is asymmetrical and to that effect, this has influenced how the regional body conducts itself as far as conflict management is concerned.*

Keywords: *Conflict Management, Power, IGAD, Distribution of power, Horn of Africa*

Abbreviations: *AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia, APSA: African Peace and Security Architecture, AU: African Union, EAC: East African Cooperation, ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States, EEBC: Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Commission, GDP: Gross Domestic Product, GoS: Government of Sudan, IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGADD: Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, IGASOM: IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia, IUC: Union of Islamic Court, PEV: Post election violence, RECs: Regional Economic Communities, SADC: South African Development Community, SPLA/M: Sudan People Liberation Army/Movement, SRRC: Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, TFG: Transitional Federal Government, TNG: Transitional National Government, UN: United Nations, UPDF: Uganda People Defense Force, USA: United States of America*

1. INTRODUCTION

The role of regional arrangements and organizations in conflict management has increased prominence in Africa and the rest of the world. While it remains the sole responsibility of the United Nations (UN) to resolve conflict all over the world, the global institution lacks the institutional capacity to be everywhere at the same time. This has paved way to delegation of responsibilities, through the UN charter, to the regional and sub regional levels.

The UN charter, Article 52, categorically states that “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”

This mandate from the UN charter was reinforced with the establishment of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the African Union (AU) in collaboration with African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) with the goal of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in the African continent (Ulrich, 2014).

However, in contemporary international relations, where there is engagement between two or more sovereign states, the concept of power will come into play. “Power is at the very core of interaction among nations”; (Gallaroti, 2011:3)

While peacemaking in the Horn of Africa has been a challenge, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has had the zeal to intervene in Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia. However, as

much as there have been conflicts in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, the efforts of IGAD has not been felt. It is what this paper is trying to give an understanding as to why the sub regional institution chose to intervene in some countries and not in others.

When Eritrea had disagreement with Ethiopia, IGAD managed to favour the sub regional power at the expense of its opponent. This saw Eritrea deregistering itself from IGAD after it lamented of Ethiopia's unbecoming behaviors. When Eritrea tried to reapply for membership, the regional body rejected its application. This was because of the 'bad blood' between Eritrea and Ethiopia, one of the largest powers in the horn

The concept of power has been identified as a subject of interrogation; the role of power in advising IGAD, whether to or not intervene, in a conflict situation within the horn is in question.

2. THE CONCEPT OF POWER

Power, just like money is to an economy, is a central ingredient in international relations. However, this crucial concept has not been agreeably defined. Scholars have not reached in to a single meaning or definition of power

Concept of power is very elusive that researchers are yet to define and describe it in a single formulation. As Guzzini (1993:443-478) conceded, power can be looked from structuralist, dispositional and interactionist approaches. These three approaches give power significantly different meanings

While scholars' definitions of the concept of power are closely related, they have demonstrated divergent discourse due to their ideological alignment. Whereas the mainstream researchers appreciate power as domination, their counterparts understand it as a capacity. Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz and Lukes, while making their own definition of power, could not avoid linking it, at least in one way or another, to domination (Karbberg, 2005). This dominative aspect of power has been sharply opposed by the feminists who recognize it as an act of concert (Follet, 1942:101).

Power can be defined as "the production in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate" (Scot, 2002). This paradigm by Scott was augmented by Barnett and Duval (2005:39-75) who wrote that it is not enough to just consider the production of effects but how they work against or in favor of actors.

Weber (1947:52) joins the debate by defining power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which the probability exists". This clearly demonstrates that little care is given to the means used to achieve ones goal, even if it means deployment of force to have things happen in some direction.

Dahl (1957:202) defines power as "the ability of *A* to get *B* alter his action in a particular direction he would not have otherwise done". More elaborately, Dahl (1957:203) went on to establish that unless there is a relationship between parties, power can never be realized; in fact he termed power as a relation

Guzzini (2002) defines power as "the ability of *A* through *x* to make *B* to do action *y*". In his elaborations, he used an example of *A* having a gun and the skills to use it as well; this is the capacity to make *B* comply. According to him, if *A* has the gun and the skills to operate it, but has not taken any action towards causing *B* to do something, then power has not been exercised.

Miller's (1982:1-2) writing defines power as "the capacity to produce changes which include activities such as nurturing and empowering others. This definition marks a great departure from the mainstream definitions and understanding of power, where it is taken as a general capacity to manipulate others, even against their will.

Barnett and Duval (2005:49) recognized that out of all the definitions of power that has been presented by scholars of international relations, Dahl's formulation is the most elaborate. This is because of the following three features; first, there must be intention in the part of *A*; if *B* mistakenly changes his action with the impression that *A* wants it to change; that is not power. Secondly, for power to be realized, there must at least a conflict of desires between *A* and *B*; *B* must desire a different outcome from that of *A*. Thirdly, *A* must have the resources at his disposal to compel *B* to alter his actions.

Dahl's formulation was augmented by Bachrach and Baratz (1962:952) who presented that power will still be considered to exist even when *A* is not aware of how his actions are affecting *B*. For example, if a state, say Kenya, changes its policies regarding the quality of goods to be imported with the

intention to protect its environment, the source market and the manufactures will automatically be affected, even though, without the consciousness of Kenya.

All the definitions put together, it is clear that for power to be exercised there must be more than one actor in a relationship, whether direct or diffuse. There also must be some form of means to influence. For example, for *A* to be able to make *B* change his will and adopt his own, *A* must poses the capacity to influence *B*. These manipulations come, mainly, in two ways, corrective or persuasive influence (Scott, 2007:25-39). Corrective and persuasive influences are the sources of the elementary forms of power, hard and soft respectively. Subsequently, the “power over” and the “power to” are anchored on the very principles of power as domination and as capacity respectively.

The corrective and persuasive influences have notably been a point of diversion in understanding between the mainstream and second stream research. While realists, who identify themselves as mainstream, have been connected to the corrective influence, the liberals, feminists and others have been linked to the persuasive style of influence.

3. MEASUREMENT OF POWER

Measurement of power, just like its definition remains a challenge; there is no absolutely agreed model of quantifying it. This scenario has seen scholars express power in relative terms. Power is measured by comparing two actors or states. But this relative measurement becomes a problem, when asymmetry, terms of power, is minimal between states.

While wealth in a monetarized economy can be measured using money, a currency to measure power is yet to be discovered (Guzzini 2009:7). For Guzzini, measurement of power brings peace. This is because war will not have to be fought, by states, as a way of proofing who is powerful (Guzzini 2009:5).

It has been of great difficulty to find an agreeable way of measuring power. Scholars of IR have been wishing they could establish a formula where they can rank states from the highest to the lowest in terms of power. However, most of the indices suggested, to measure power, are trying to use country’s resources like military, gross national product (GNP) and population (Richard and Dina, 1988:141-151). Nye and Armitage (2006:6) augment that in the past power has been getting measured with the use of criteria like population size, economic strength, social stability, territory and military resources.

Equating resources to power may sometimes be a real disappointment. To translate resources into power, states need skills and strategies. As Dahl (1991:27) explains “it is difficult enough to estimate relative influence within a particular scope and domain; it is by no means clear how we can ‘add up’ influence over many scopes and domains in order to arrive at total, or aggregate, influence”.

4. ESTIMATION OF POWER IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Measurement of power has been appreciated in line with the discourses provided by scholars of IR. More so, power has been estimated with the war winning capabilities of states. Aspects such as population, economic capabilities, military size, strength of armies and their budgets, have been put into considerations. In some instances, the model have tried to use rankings that have been made from reliable sources to try and deduce which states in the regions are relatively powerful than others.

Table I. *A model of power estimation*¹

No	Country	Population (millions)	GDP (USD) In billions	Military budget(USD) In millions	Military size	African Military power ranking
1	Ethiopia	99.39	61.54	340	138,000	3
2	Kenya	46.05	63.40	595	29,120	11
3	Uganda	39.03	27.53	280	55,000	16
4	Sudan	40.23	97.16	2470	349,000	8
5	South Sudan	12.34	9.02	545	210,000	18
6	Djibouti	0.89	1.73	0.405	27,000	>30
7	Somalia	10.79	5.93	0.059	20,000	29
8	Eritrea	4.79	2.61	0.064	321,000	>30

¹ The table was modeled from several source; the population and the GDP was obtained from World Bank; the military ranking and defense budget was sourced from Global Fire Power; and the military size was obtained from International Institute of Strategic Studies

From the table above it is inferable that Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda are comparatively powerful than Somalia, Eritrea, South Sudan and Djibouti.

5. IGAD AND ITS INTERVENTIONS IN THE REGION

This section tries to display how IGAD has been able to intervene in the various conflict situations in the horn of Africa. The examples taken include the cases South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea – Where IGAD has intervened and Kenya where IGAD intervention was never felt.

5.1. IGAD Interventions in Sudan

The Sudan conflict was a complex one, marred by identity conflict with key marker being religion. The war went on for decades and millions of people were killed and displaced. Because of vested interests among the IGAD member states, Sudan civil war received a complex approach from the region. IGAD had to be cautious in balancing peace processes and the conflict of interest from the member.

While Khartoum, which is Islamic dominated, was fighting to have an Islamic state, Juba which is mainly subjugated by Christians and animist was struggling to have a secular state – where the state is separate from religion (Dagne, 2000:27-28).

President Museveni was in not in good books- diplomatically- with Khartoum because of his support for the Sudan People Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). In 1997, Uganda was accused of supplying weapons and providing military support to SPLA/M (Murithi, 2009). Similarly, Khartoum provided support to Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a militia group, based at the northern Uganda, fighting the government of President Museveni. These cases made Uganda to be “out of question” as part of the negotiating states because it was deemed to be automatically biased towards the SPLA/M apart from being viewed suspiciously by the Government of Sudan (GoS).

Eritrea was also in proxy wars with Khartoum. While the GoS has been funding and providing military support to Eritrean Islamic Jihad group that was fighting the government of President Aferworki, Eritrea also reciprocated by supporting the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) through funding and giving them weapons (Terlinden, 2004:12-16)

Ethiopia also, by the time, had a bad diplomatic record with Khartoum. While Addis Ababa had supported SPLA, an opposition to Khartoum, GoS had also reciprocated by assisting in the overthrow of Haile Mariam by the new Minister Zenawi Meles (Young, 2007:9)

With these preceding challenges, ranging from religion to bad diplomatic records, IGAD had to work along a thin line. It had to handle mediation in a way that the warring parties will have the confidence of getting a fair result from the process.

Given that GoS had diplomatic issues with Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea, the remaining state that offered a sensible option, having in mind that Djibouti was not a member of the conflict committee, and Somalia was in more problems, was Kenya (Young, 2007:9). Kenya then became the best regional candidate to lead the negotiation process. Both the Sudanese government and SPLA/M had high level of confidence with the process being led by Kenya because it had never been involved in Sudan civil war.

With the knowledge and considerations of all the dynamics involved in the Sudan civil war, the IGAD Head of States (HoS) during 1997 asked Kenya to lead the peace process. This was because Sudan was effectively at war with Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda through the support of anti – Khartoum rebels and Sudan was also doing likewise to them (Terlinden, 2004:12-16).

The intense pressure on the parties was followed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2015 where the Machakos Protocol, the Declaration of principles, the Naivasha Agreements and the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) as well as the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was incorporated. The agreement also had in place some framework for sharing resources, sharing of power and demarcation of boundaries (Murithi, 2009).

5.2. IGAD Intervention in Somalia

The collapse and the problems of Somalia come in 1991 after the end of dictatorship from Siad Barre, which was accompanied by three years of continuous war. This paved in interventions in form of peace processes from countries from within and without the Horn of Africa.

The Somalia peace process was one of its kinds, in fact, more complex than the Sudan peace process. While the Sudan peace process had defined stakeholders, which were mainly the SPLA/M and the GoS, the Somalia peace process had a very complex stakeholder base that included the Transitional Federal Government, the warlords, the elders from the clans and the leaders from the Somaliland and the Puntland. Though it was anticipated that the peace process was going to be a difficult one, the stakeholder base made it more complex for the regional body to reach to a sustainable deal.

IGAD employed a combination of approaches in trying to sort out the complicated conflict in Somalia. These tactics included but not limited to peace keeping, protection of the young government as well as pursuing negotiation processes.

IGAD made several attempts, through its member states, to negotiate between several factions and bring an understanding among them. In early 2000, Ismail Omah Guelleh, the president of Djibouti pursued his own Somali negotiation process. President Ismail's process yielded the Transitional National Government (TNG) which was headed by Abdulqasim Salat by August 2000. This formation was fully supported by United Nations (UN), IGAD and the coalition of Arab and African countries (Murithi, 2009).

Immediately the Djibouti arrangement was reached, Ethiopia and Somaliland rejected the whole process condemning its alignment to Islamic terrorists. This rejection was a blow to IGAD and completely undermined the peace process in Somalia. IGAD had to think of an alternative way to handle the peace process.

In January 2002 at the IGAD summit, President Moi was asked to lead a joint initiative together with Ethiopia and Djibouti to bring TNG and the warlords to a common understanding. While TNG had a backing from Djibouti, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) - a warlord group - was being supported by Ethiopia. Kenya sat at the middle as the mediator (Heally, 2009:9-15). This joint initiative, in October 2004, gave birth to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Abdulahi Yusuf was elected as the president.

After the formation of TFG, a baby of IGAD, the regional body had the responsibility to protect it. In January 2005, IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) was to deploy peace keepers to protect the new arrangement of governance. Even though the deployment of the IGASOM troops did not take place, because of a number of challenges, IGAD had all the intentions to protect the new government (Hull and Svenson, 2008:18-19).

In 2006 with funding from the United States of America (USA), Ethiopia deployed its troops to Somalia. With the labeling of the Union of Islamic Court (IUC) as terrorist, Ethiopia and USA had all the reasons, under the "war on terror", to get into Somalia and fight to protect the TFG (Hull and Svenson, 2008:19).

This intervention was met with a lot of resistance from IUC and Somali nationalists causing a lot of radicalism and religious extremism. Finally Ethiopia yielded to the pressure and withdrew its troops from Somalia. This pressure and political situation offered opportunities for the regional organization to intervene calling for a decisive role by IGAD and AU. This saw the deployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007 (Demeke, 2014:248-257)

The peace processes by IGAD was also marred by a lot of challenges, the same challenges that was faced while handing the Sudan process, the one of involvement of member states in the conflicts of the warring state.

The involvement of Ethiopia in the conflicts in Somalia has overwhelmingly thwarted and assisted the peace process with almost equal measures. From the Ogaden war to the deployment of troops at Gedo region to fight the Islamic Al-Ittihad, which was allegedly having links with Al-Qaida to the support that Ethiopia has been offering Somaliland and the SRRC (Terlinden, 2004:8-11). This immense participation of Ethiopia, one of the influential states in the Horn of Africa, tremendously swayed the processes of peace.

The interest of Ethiopia in Somalia was to protect itself from the terrorist insurgents that were likely to occur due to the activities of radical Islamism that was surfacing in Somalia (Healy, 2009). This was in addition to the fact that Ethiopia feared that a stable Somalia will revive their urge to reclaim the Ogaden area in the pursuance of the reclaiming the Somali community occupancy to Somalia.

In the mid 1990s, the African Union (AU) and IGAD mandated Ethiopia to mediate for Somalia. This approach failed completely because Ethiopia juggled a lot of roles, that of a mediator, regional power and as a spoiler (Terlinden, 2004:8-11).

In an IGAD summit in October 2003, the HoS agreed that all member states, except Somalia, to be included in the committee; this saw Uganda and Djibouti were brought into the picture (Terlinden, 2004:9). This way, IGAD was playing a smart game to ensure that there is a consolidated support as they head towards a crucial stage of the peace process.

When there was little progress, IGAD would involve external partners, like the UN and the US to exert some pressure in the process. For instance, the Djibouti agreement of 2008 signed between TFG and the Alliance for the Rehabilitation of Somalia (ARS) was brokered by Djibouti and the United Nations (UN). This arrangement was fully supported by IGAD and therefore, led to the HoS's call for Somalia to draft a new constitution (Murithi, 2009:136-157)

Interestingly, IGAD operated, yet again while handling the Somalia peace process, very diplomatically. IGAD did not involve itself directly in the resolution processes; it just endorsed individual member state to either singly or as partners to handle the conflict resolution processes. IGAD also found a smart way of exerting pressure to the warring parties from the IGAD partners like the Troika (US, Britain and Norway) as well as the UN (Woodward, 2004:469-481)

5.3. IGAD and Kenya in 2008 Post Election Violence (PEV)

The post-election violence in Kenya was in itself, an end to the regional uniqueness of the state. While other states have been unstable, Kenya has been enjoying peace. This stability enjoyed by Kenya had made it a regional mediator and a mentor to the other IGAD member states.

IGAD member states, as much as their efforts in restoring peace in Kenya was meager, it was outright that it recognized the legitimacy of the government of the day and supported the AU's call for the amicable resolution through mediation. The notion of protection of the region from foreign interference was evident when IGAD member unanimously agreed to shield Kenya from the International Criminal Court (ICC)

Immediately the contested election was announced by Samuel Kivuitu, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) chair, the President of the Republic of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, endorsed President Mwai Kibaki as legitimate.

The regional response was rather low, if not zero, during the Kenyan crisis. The main obstacle for IGAD intervention was the legacy, pride and the regional exceptionalism that Kenya had earned itself. Kenya had a rich history of mediating regional conflicts and was often associated with the provision of solutions to regional problems (Khadiagala, 2009:438). This scenario made the IGAD member states inferior and was not comfortable mediating for Kenya, a renowned mediator.

Nevertheless, even with the minimal effort from IGAD in the Kenyan Peace process, its support was unprecedented. Immediately the Kenyan peace deal had been brokered by His Excellency Kofi Anan and his team, IGAD was very swift to support Kenya against the ICC. This saw IGAD supporting the Kenyan government to set up internal mechanism to bring the perpetrator to justice, within a period of twelve months, as requested by President Kibaki (Presidential Press Service of Kenya, 2011)

5.4. IGAD Intervention in South Sudan

South Sudan as the youngest nation in the world has met a lot of challenges before it could barely stand on its own. No sooner had they finished their separation processes with Sudan, than there was a misunderstanding between President Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar. This hostility caused a deadly civil war that has seen millions of people displaced and others losing lives and property.

The fact that South Sudan was an IGAD 'baby' tasked the regional body to act swiftly to bring order in the world youngest state.

IGAD employed the same approaches, as in Somalia, in managing the conflict in South Sudan. The tactics used by the regional body included the deployment of peace keepers, the pursuance of reconciliatory process and the protection of the legitimate government.

Just when the conflict erupted, the Uganda People Defense Force (UPDF) was deployed by the Ugandan government, to assist President Salva Kiir to remain in office and to protect the legitimate

government. When this happened, IGAD did not reprimand Uganda's action but on the contrary, it encouraged Kampala to urge Juba to accept a peace deal with the opposition (Witt, 2004:8)

While Uganda was actively involved in the war, trying to protect the legitimate government; Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya were pushing for a mediation process between the two factions.

When the conflict erupted in South Sudan, IGAD head of states and governments summit was convened in Nairobi and special envoys were nominated to start the mediation process (Akol, 2014:3). The Ethiopia based mediation tapped the experience of Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya, Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia who was the chairperson and Mohammed El Dhabri of Sudan. These reconciliatory efforts received a lot of support from the AU, the UN and the international community at large.

Lastly, IGAD employed the tactic of peace keeping. Under the Umbrella of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)-under UN Security Council resolution 2155(2014) - Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia have contributed both the military and police personnel to assist the war torn IGAD member state in peacekeeping (United Nations, 2014).

With these foregoing cleavage and interests of the individual states in the outcome of the civil war in South Sudan, IGAD had to come up with a solution for the youngest state in the world. In January 2014, at the head of state summit, Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) was first in many times reached by consensus (International Crisis Group, 2015:15).

5.5. IGAD Intervention in Eritrea

Eritrea joined Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), the predecessor of IGAD in 1993 after it attained its independence and international recognition. This was met with a lot of expectation from the international community as far as regional cooperation, in the world most fragile region, was concerned. Eritrea proved this by playing an integral part in the rebranding and revitalization of IGADD into IGAD which was completed in 1996.

Eritrea's existence in the region was marred with challenges that led to a sour relationship with its neighbours and by extension the sub-regional body, IGAD. Troubles started in 1994 when Eritrea got in problems with Sudan (Muller, 2007:33). Sudan had supported an Islamic jihadist group that was engaging in military attacks with the Eritrean government. This action was reciprocated by Eritrea's government through the support of the armed groups that was committed to overthrow the ruling Sudanese regime.

The Ethio-Eritrean war, which occurred between the year 1998 and 2000, is another development that impaired the relationship of Eritrea, the neighbouring states and IGAD. More trouble and dissatisfactions came after the signing of the Algiers agreement in December 2000. The agreement saw the establishment of Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC) that was charged with the responsibility of demarcating the borders between the two warring states. It was agreed that the decision of EEBC shall be accepted by the two states and therefore binding.

When the verdict of EEBC came out in April 2002 and awarded Badme to Eritrea, Ethiopia rejected it saying it had won the war and was already occupying the area (Redie, 2009:111). Ethiopia's rejection and the silence by the international community, including IGAD, disappointed Eritrea so much that it resorted to pursue other means. Eritrea then decided to wage proxy war within Ethiopia and in Somalia

The third blow to Eritrea in the region was when Ethiopia invaded Somalia to wage war against the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in defense of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a regime that was put in place by IGAD. The fact Eritrea supported IUC, a group that had been linked to the al-Qaeda terror group, really angered IGAD (Bogale 2014:4). This discomfort from IGAD member states led to the self-suspension by Eritrea in April 2007.

The fourth problem that faced Eritrea was in 2008 when it was accused by IGAD of perpetrating military attack on Djibouti. This was followed by another setback where IGAD welcomed the UN sanctions of 2010 which came because Eritrea was accused of fighting federal government of Somalia through alliance with armed groups.

In 2011, after four years being out of IGAD, Eritrea expressed its ambitions to rejoin the regional body. This readmission has not been formalized up to now because of some deliberate obstruction, resistances and discomfort of Ethiopia (Tesfa-Alem, 2012)

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6. CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that in the horn of Africa, distribution of power is asymmetrical. While Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan have been displayed to relatively powerful, Somalia, Djibouti, South Sudan and Eritrea have been exhibited to be less powerful.

This work has also depicted that the powerful states, even though they have had conflicts, have never received noticeable intervention or support from IGAD. While the Ugandan government has been battling with the LRA for years, the regional body has never come to rescue in any way.

During the PEV in Kenya, the regional body shied off because the East African economic power house had too much peacemaking legacy for IGAD to handle (Khadiagala, 2009:431-444). This left Kenya to the rescue of the AU and other international players.

When Eritrea had a misunderstanding with Ethiopia, IGAD openly sided with Ethiopia and even influenced the international community against Eritrea. This saw the sidelining of Eritrea which pushed it to deregistration. When Eritrea tried to pursue its re-registration as a member of IGAD in 2011, Ethiopia influenced its rejection. Up to now Eritrea is not a member of the sub-regional community.

When there are conflicts in Somalia, almost every IGAD member state would enter so easily as compared to Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Kenya were all in Somalia trying to intervene in one way or the other at some given time. Even Uganda fully participated by sending its troops to participate in the AMISOM peace keeping.

In South Sudan, immediately there was a conflict as a result of disagreement between President Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar, there was rush by the IGAD member states to intervene. UPDF was the first to be deployed to protect the legitimate government. This was followed by meetings by the IGAD summit in order to resolve the stalemate.

This paper has created an inference that IGAD intervention in a conflict situation is advised by the distribution of power among its member states. This is in appreciation to the following sentiments, "Power is at the very core of interaction among nations" (Gallaroti, 2011:3); "Distribution of power explains states' behavior and the outcome of their interaction" (Guzzini, 2009:4).

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